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School of Education, Durham University, UK 
 
Abstract 
Ragin’s (2008) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) provides a way of undertaking 
case-based configurational analysis, focusing on necessary and sufficient conditions. QCA is 
increasingly used to undertake systematic set-theoretic analyses of small qualitative datasets 
and, occasionally, to analyse survey datasets. Ragin has discussed the problems caused by the 
“limited diversity” characteristic of social scientific data, and demonstrated how 
counterfactual analysis can alleviate these. The Standard Analysis module of his fsQCA 
software (Ragin 2008) incorporates this counterfactual reasoning approach. Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012, 2013) argue that there are problems with Ragin’s approach and propose an 
Enhanced Standard Analysis. They focus on the ways in which, during a QCA, necessary 
conditions can become “hidden” during the analysis of “truth tables” characterised by limited 
diversity. Our paper, having introduced the necessary background, argues that their proposed 
solutions introduce new problems, some of a logical kind, and must be treated with care.  
Keywords 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), necessary conditions, limited diversity, set 
theoretic methods, counterfactual analysis. 
 
  
                                                          
1 This paper was presented at the conference, Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Applications and 
Methodological Challenges, held at Goethe University, Frankfurt, 22-23 November 2013. 
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Introduction 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), developed by Charles Ragin (1987, 2000, 2006, 
2008), is a configurational method which analyses the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
an outcome, or its absence, to occur. Put simply, to establish the sufficiency of a condition, or 
a combination of conditions, for some outcome, it assesses whether the set of cases with the 
condition is a subset of the set of cases with the outcome. To establish necessity, it assesses 
whether the set of cases with the outcome is a subset of the set of cases with the condition. 
The question of whether QCA establishes causal claims or, less ambitiously, provides 
complex descriptions and/or predictive claims, continues to be debated. For the purposes of 
this paper, we can, we think, put this question to one side (see Cooper and Glaesser 2012a for 
one view). Ragin has also developed methods for using QCA, with both crisp and fuzzy sets
2
, 
in contexts where sufficiency and necessity might be only approximated to, and for using 
counterfactual analysis to alleviate the problems arising from “limited diversity” in 
populations of cases (Ragin 2000, 2008). With the term “limited diversity”, Ragin draws our 
attention to a problem that commonly arises in non-experimental social research, especially 
but not only where our samples are small: the social world, or the section of it from which we 
gain our data, often fails to supply us with information on all the possible combinations of the 
putatively causal factors picked out by our theoretical models of the production of some 
outcome.  
 
QCA is now widely used and there is an increasing demand for texts detailing how it should 
be employed. An important addition to this literature is Schneider and Wagemann (2012). 
Their book discusses problems that, it claims, characterise QCA’s "Standard Analysis" (see 
Ragin 2008: chapter 9) procedure and develops an "Enhanced Standard Analysis" (ESA).  
One key claim is that ESA offers a better way of dealing with the problem of limited 
diversity than Ragin's Standard Analysis. This claim is repeated in Schneider and Wagemann 
(2013). Arguments employing "necessary conditions" play a crucial role in developing this 
ESA. For this reason, we develop our critical arguments by focusing on Schneider and 
Wagemann’s discussion of “hidden necessary conditions”. We point to some serious 
problems, exemplified in their discussion of the work of Stokke (2004, 2007). We argue it 
would be unsafe to follow the authors’ ESA without considering some of its unintended 
paradoxical effects. We will deal first with their claims concerning “hidden necessary 
conditions due to incoherent counterfactuals” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 221) and, 
secondly, with those concerning “hidden necessary conditions due to inconsistent truth table 
rows” (225).  
 
We try, in considering Schneider and Wagemann’s claims concerning the sources of hidden 
necessary conditions, to take a more general approach than they have, not only because we 
believe this reveals what seem to be serious problems in their analysis, but also because we 
wish to encourage users of QCA to think in a more general way about the problems they 
address. We know that, in the past, many researchers using conventional approaches have 
tended towards rule-following (for example, in the often inappropriate, and merely ritualistic, 
use of significance testing). We don’t want to see something similar happen to set theoretic 
approaches. They need to be used self-critically. The careful reader of Schneider and 
Wagemann’s work will find ideas and suggestions that could be useful in this regard, such as 
their suggestions, in their presentation of “Theory-guided Enhanced Standard Analysis”, for 
                                                          
2
 By crisp sets, sometimes called standard or conventional sets, we refer to sets where a case has either zero or 
full membership, scored algebraically by 0 or 1 respectively. In fuzzy sets, a case can also have partial 
membership, with scores running from 0 (full non-membership) to 1 (full membership). A membership of 0.5 
indicates maximum ambiguity of membership (see Ragin 2000; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). 
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the use of counterfactuals that Ragin’s Standard Analysis procedure might rule out. However, 
at this stage of development of set theoretic approaches, users of QCA need, we believe, to 
take a cautious and critical stance towards recommendations for “good” or “best practice” of 
the sort offered by Schneider and Wagemann.  
 
There are a few notational conventions that we must introduce. If we have a condition or 
outcome indicated by X, then we will indicate its absence by ~X. However, in quoting and 
discussing others’ work, we will also make use of an alternative notation where upper case, 
X, indicates the presence of a condition and lower case, x, its absence or negation. We will 
sometimes use an asterisk, *, as in X*Y, to indicate set intersection, i.e. the conjunction of 
two (or more) conditions. In some quotes from other authors, however, we also use X.Y, 
following their use of the dot for intersection. Where it does not lead to any confusion we and 
others also abbreviate X*Y or X.Y to XY.  All of X*Y, X.Y and XY therefore indicate the 
intersection of X and Y. A plus sign, +, as in X+Y, will indicate logical OR, i.e. that either X 
or Y or both are present. We will use X => O to indicate that X is sufficient for the outcome 
O to occur.  
 
In order to address the problems in Schneider and Wagemann’s use of necessary conditions, 
we need first to introduce a general problem they aim to address, that of “limited diversity” in 
datasets and the use of counterfactual analysis to address this. We draw on Ragin and 
Sonnett’s (2005, 2008) treatment and then move on to discuss Schneider and Wagemann’s 
(2012) own claims. 
 
Ragin and Sonnett on Limited Diversity and Counterfactual Cases 
Ragin and Sonnett (2005, 2008) note that naturally occurring social phenomena are 
profoundly limited in their diversity, and that such limited diversity severely complicates 
their analysis, demonstrating this with reference to the simple hypothetical truth table shown 
in Table 1. Their focus is on the possible consequences of strong unions (U) and/or strong left 
parties (L) for the existence of a generous welfare state (G).  
 
Table 1: Simple Example of the Impact of Limited Diversity (Table 8.1 from Ragin and 
Sonnett 2008: 148) 
Strong unions(U) Strong left parties (L) Generous welfare state (G) N 
Yes  Yes Yes 6 
Yes No No 8 
No No No 5 
No Yes ? 0 
 
They note that inspection of the table shows a perfect correlation between L and G, offering a 
simple parsimonious explanation, where parsimony refers to employing fewer causal 
conditions. This, they note, explains all the observed variance in the outcome. When L is 
present, so is G. When L is absent, so is G. However, there are no cases combining the 
absence of strong unions with the presence of a strong left party. They argue that an 
alternative case-oriented explanation might, given the evidence, favour the claim that the 
combination of strong unions and strong left parties explains the presence of a generous 
welfare state. They then claim that which answer is correct depends on the outcome that 
would be observed for the missing type of case (row 4 of Table 1):  
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At a more formal level, which answer is correct depends on the outcome that would 
be observed for cases exhibiting the presence of strong left parties combined with the 
absence of strong unions—that is, if such cases could be found. If these cases 
displayed generous welfare states, then the conclusion would be that having strong 
left parties, by itself, causes generous welfare states. If these cases failed to display 
generous welfare states, then the conclusion would be that it is the combination of 
strong left parties and strong unions that explains generous welfare states. If relevant 
cases combining strong left parties and weak unions could not be identified, then 
researchers must speculate: What would happen in such cases? Would generous 
welfare states emerge? To answer these questions, researchers must rely on their 
substantive and theoretical knowledge, which in turn would provide the basis for 
deciding between the two explanations, the parsimonious (single cause) account 
versus the more complex (combined causes) account. In short, the choice of 
explanations is theory and knowledge dependent. (Ragin and Sonnett 2008: 149, 
emphasis in original). 
 
They describe the activity of assessing plausible outcomes for missing cases as counterfactual 
analysis
3
.  For the purposes of QCA, with its basis in Boolean algebra, a row like the fourth 
row of Table 1 is a remainder, “a combination of causal conditions that lacks empirical 
instances” (Ragin 2008: 155).  The solution derived in a QCA of Table 1 focusing on what 
combinations of conditions are sufficient for the existence of a generous welfare state will 
vary depending on what counterfactual assumptions are made about the outcome that might 
be associated with the missing combination of conditions.  If this row is excluded from the 
process of Boolean minimisation
4
, then we obtain U*L => G, i.e. the combination of strong 
unions and strong left parties is sufficient for a generous welfare state. On the other hand, a 
more parsimonious solution can be obtained here by deciding to allocate the outcome to the 
missing combination. In this case, the more parsimonious solution would be simply L => G, 
and is based on the simplifying assumption that the missing combination would be sufficient 
for the outcome G, i.e. that ~U*L => G. This assumption, combined with the empirical 
finding that U*L => G (from row 1) allows us to argue that it makes no difference to the 
outcome whether U is present or not, and therefore we are able to derive the solution L => G 
via Boolean minimisation
5
. As Ragin and Sonnett note (2008: 157) this counterfactual claim 
makes a very strong assumption, one that many researchers would find implausible. The key 
point though is that explanations hinge on such counterfactual decisions, even if researchers 
are not always aware of this. The complex solution itself here, U*L => G, effectively 
depends, for example, on the assumption that, were any cases of ~U*L to be found, they 
would not have the outcome. The truth of the sufficiency claim that U*L=>G is, of course, 
not affected by the decision on ~U*L, only the possibility of producing a more parsimonious 
solution for G.   
 
The crucial point made by Ragin here concerns, we think, the role of theory. Schneider and 
Wagemann also stress the importance of drawing on theory in many places in their book, 
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An introduction to the role of counterfactual analysis in the quantitative and qualitative research traditions can 
be found in Goertz and Mahoney (2012). See also Thomson (2011) for a related discussion concentrating on 
QCA.  
4
 A researcher might exclude it simply because it has no cases. An analysis would then proceed without any 
reference to counterfactual analysis.  
5
 Boolean minimisation is a key feature of QCA. In general, the idea is to remove redundant conditions by 
making pairwise comparisons of the sort made here. Through repeated application of the procedure the solution 
of a truth table can be expressed in a simpler form. Cooper and Glaesser (2012a) argue this may sometimes lead 
us away from underlying causal mechanisms.  
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especially when they argue for privileging theory over considerations of parsimony when 
making choices concerning which logical remainders ought to be used in constructing a 
solution (e.g. their summary on page 217). However, as we shall see in the next section of 
this paper, in their discussion of hidden necessary conditions, they often refer primarily to the 
empirical evidence available in making their decisions about such matters as which 
conditions are necessary or not. As an illustration of the approach they take in chapter 9 of 
their book, we can note three things about the dataset in Table 1. We use the language they 
use (see their page 222): 
Statement N1: U “empirically qualifies as a necessary condition” for G 
Statement N2: L “empirically qualifies as a necessary condition” for G 
Statement N3: ~L “empirically qualifies as a necessary condition” for ~G 
Now, were N1 to be taken seriously, i.e. if we were to accept it as an adequate warrant for the 
necessity of U for G, then it would follow logically that ~U is sufficient for ~G. We can see 
the dataset does not allow us to test this claim properly.  We lack one of the two truth table 
rows we need for a complete test to be made. A parallel argument applies to statement N3. 
We will later explore the implications of this problem for Schneider and Wagemannn’s 
treatment of the Stokke dataset on shaming in the context of fish stocks conservation.  
Ragin (2008) develops this discussion of counterfactual analysis further, focusing on the 
distinction between easy and difficult counterfactuals, and the three solutions that different 
decisions about remainders can generate in QCA’s Standard Analysis: complex, intermediate 
and parsimonious. We will return to the differentiating features of the three types of solutions 
below in the context of Ragin’s discussion of Stokke’s (2004, 2007) study, but we need 
briefly to explain Ragin’s distinction between easy and difficult counterfactuals in order for 
what follows to be comprehensible. Imagine a QCA focusing on the outcome O and the 
potentially causal conditions A, B, C and D. Imagine also that the truth table has cases for the 
row ABC~D but none for the row ABCD, i.e. that ABCD is a remainder. Ragin (2008) 
argues that, if we have good theoretical reasons for believing that the presence of D, rather 
than its absence, should contribute to the outcome, then, given that ABC~D is associated with 
the outcome, we could argue that ABCD would be, since here ~D is replaced by D. ABCD is 
therefore an easy counterfactual. Then, since we now have ABC~D empirically associated 
with the outcome and ABCD counterfactually so, we can argue that whether D is or is not 
present makes no relevant difference, and combine these two terms to give the minimised 
term ABC. By contrast, had we had cases for ABCD, but not for ABC~D, and had still 
believed that it was the presence of D that was conducive to the outcome, we would not have 
had good reasons for allowing the remainder ABC~D to be associated with the outcome. 
ABC~D is a difficult or hard counterfactual and we would not want to see it used to enable 
ABCD to be minimised to ABC unless there were compelling theoretical arguments. The role 
of such decisions in generating the Standard Analysis’s three types of solution will become 
clearer below where we turn to introducing the three types of solution: complex, intermediate 
and parsimonious. We do this in the context of Stokke’s (2004, 2007) work on resource 
management.  
 
Ragin on Limited Diversity and Counterfactual Cases: the case of Stokke’s work 
Stokke’s (2004, 2007) research focuses on “shaming” as a strategy for improving the impact 
of international regimes in the area of resource management. Here, the substance of his work 
is not our focus, but it is necessary to describe it briefly. He sketches ten cases taken from 
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three regions. These concern cod stocks in the Barents Sea and the North West Atlantic and 
Antarctic krill stocks in the southern ocean.  Shaming aims to expose fishing practices “to 
third parties whose opinion matters to the intended target of shaming” (Stokke 2007: 503). 
Stokke argues for five conditions that are likely to lead to successful shaming.  These are 
usefully summarised by Ragin (2008: 167) in his discussion of Stokke’s work. They are: 
 
1. Advice (A): Whether the shamers can substantiate their criticism with reference to 
explicit recommendations of the regime's scientific advisory body. 
2. Commitment (C): Whether the target behaviour explicitly violates a conservation 
measure adopted by the regime's decision-making body. 
3. Shadow of the future (S): Perceived need of the target of shaming to strike new deals 
under the regime—such beneficial deals are likely to be jeopardized if criticism is 
ignored. 
4. Inconvenience (I): The inconvenience (to the target of shaming) of the behavioural 
change that the shamers are trying to prompt. 
5. Reverberation (R): The domestic political costs to the target of shaming for not 
complying (i.e., for being scandalised as a culprit). 
 
Stokke’s outcome measure is successful shaming. Stokke’s ten cases of “shaming” set out in 
a truth table ready for QCA to be applied are shown in Table 2. In such tables, a 1 is used to 
indicate the presence of a condition or of the outcome, and a 0 their absence. We have added 
a column to show the absence of the outcome, ~SUCCESS, since we need this later.  
 
Table 2: Truth table, adapted from Stokke (2007) to include ~SUCCESS as an outcome 
A C S I R SUCCESS ~SUCCESS n 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
 
With five conditions, a fully populated truth table will have 2
5
, or 32, rows. It is therefore 
important to note that Table 2 includes only eight of the possible 32 combinations of the 
presence or absence of the five conditions. The unsimplified solution of this truth table that 
uses only the empirical information is given by Stokke (2007), who uses the upper / lower 
case notation, as Equation 1: 
 
Equation 1:  A.c.S.I.R + A.C.S.I.R + A.C.S.i.r + A.c.s.i.r => SUCCESS 
 
This can be reduced, by Boolean minimisation of the first two terms, to the “complex” 
solution that is reported by fsQCA: 
 
Equation 2:   A.S.I.R + A.C.S.i.r + A.c.s.i.r => SUCCESS 
 
7 
 
Stokke also lists alternative solutions that depend on different simplifying assumptions being 
made about the remainders, i.e. the 24 logically possible rows without any cases that do not 
appear in Table 2. Such assumptions, as noted earlier, allow the analyst to derive a more 
parsimonious solution, by allocating either the outcome or its absence to all or some of the 
missing rows in Table 2. Stokke also considers solutions for the absence of his outcome of 
successful shaming.  
 
Ragin (2008), using Stokke’s truth table to discuss and illustrate counterfactual analysis, 
notes that the complex solution shown in Equation 2 above effectively sets all the remainders 
to “false”, i.e. assumes that, were the missing configurations to be in the truth table, they 
would have the outcome ~SUCCESS. Ragin also derives the parsimonious solution of this 
truth table, i.e. the solution that is generated when the QCA software is allowed to allocate 
either the outcome SUCCESS or its negation ~SUCCESS to each remainder row guided only 
by the criterion of parsimony (i.e. by the desire to reduce the number of causal conditions 
appearing in the solution). Ragin, it is important to note, stresses, in his general treatment of 
these types of solution, that neither of these two extreme options seem attractive.  The 
complex solution may be needlessly complex, in so far as it does not use available easy 
counterfactuals, while the parsimonious solution may be “unrealistically parsimonious due to 
the incorporation of difficult counterfactuals” (2008: 163). The parsimonious solution is: 
 
Equation 3:  ~I + S*R => SUCCESS 
 
where the + indicates logical OR. Ragin explains that the complex and the parsimonious 
solutions can be seen as the end points of a range of solutions all of which stand in sub- or 
superset relations with one another. These end points are shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1 (from Ragin 2008) 
 
 
The left-hand complex solution here is a subset of the right-hand parsimonious solution, this 
following from the fact that the parsimonious solution includes all of the rows with the 
outcome from the complex solution as well as some additional remainder rows that have been 
allocated the solution counterfactually. Ragin notes that other solutions along the 
complexity/parsimony continuum are possible. Such intermediate solutions are determined 
by which subsets of the remainders that are used to generate the parsimonious solution are 
incorporated in this revised solution (Ragin 2008:165). As he explains, any available 
intermediate solutions, given the way they are generated, must be supersets of the complex 
solution and subsets of the parsimonious solution
6
. As we explained earlier, which, if any, of 
the logically available intermediate solutions is to be preferred to the complex solution hinges 
                                                          
6
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) make much of the fact that the Standard Analysis constrains intermediate 
solutions to fall somewhere on this continuum, i.e. it rules out the use of counterfactuals that are not already 
incorporated into the parsimonious solution.  This is an important issue but not, we think, one relevant to the 
arguments we make in this paper. 
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on decisions about easy and hard counterfactuals, i.e. about which remainders should be 
incorporated into the solution. Ragin (2008: 168-171) uses counterfactual reasoning to 
determine which remainders should be allowed into an intermediate solution. He decides, for 
example, looking at the term ASIR from Figure 1 above, that AS~IR would also be likely to 
produce successful shaming, given that “the fact that it is inconvenient (I) for the targets of 
shaming to change their behaviour does not promote successful shaming”. He therefore 
argues that the condition I can be dropped from ASIR by allocating the remainder AS~IR the 
outcome, and minimising these two to ASR, since whether we have I or ~I will make no 
difference to the outcome. By using such reasoning
7
 he finally produces the intermediate 
solution: 
 
Equation 4:  A~I + ASR => SUCCESS 
It is important to note, given our later discussion of what Schneider and Wagemann (2012) 
argue about necessary conditions, that Ragin refers (2008: 171) to necessary conditions in 
discussing this solution. He notes that Stokke (2004) includes condition A in his results, 
adding A back into Equation 3 to give Equation 4, having tested for its necessity prior to his 
undertaking sufficiency tests, as recommended in Ragin (2000). The key point in relation to 
our later discussion of their comments on Ragin’s Standard Analysis is that Schneider and 
Wagemann deem condition A an “empirical necessary condition” since, in Table 2, 
SUCCESS never occurs without A also being present.  
 
Ragin summarises his discussion of counterfactuals in general, and Stokke’s truth table in 
particular, thus: 
 
Many researchers who use QCA either incorporate as many simplifying 
assumptions (counterfactuals) as possible or they avoid them altogether. They 
should instead strike a balance between complexity and parsimony, using 
substantive and theoretical knowledge to conduct thought experiments .... QCA 
can be used to derive the two ends of the complexity/parsimony continuum. 
Intermediate solutions can be constructed anywhere along this continuum, as long 
as the subset principle is maintained (that is, solutions closer to the complexity 
end of the continuum must be subsets of solutions closer to the parsimony end). 
An optimal intermediate solution can be obtained by removing individual causal 
conditions that are inconsistent with existing knowledge from combinations in the 
complex solution, while maintaining the subset relation with the most 
parsimonious solution. (Ragin 2008: 171-172) 
 
Importantly, the fsQCA software, as part of its Standard Analysis, makes available the three 
solutions. To generate an intermediate solution the researcher is asked to choose whether, for 
each condition, the condition should be assumed to contribute to the outcome, when it is 
present, when it is absent, or when it is “present or absent”. We now consider some of 
Schneider and Wagemann’s concerns about this Standard Analysis procedure, concentrating 
on their discussion of hidden necessary conditions.  
 
Schneider and Wagemann on Stokke and their ESA 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) argue that the Standard Analysis embedded in the fsQCA 
package (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006) has weaknesses. In particular, they argue that it can 
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He also takes account of the requirement that any term in the intermediate solution must contain the conditions 
specified in the term of the parsimonious solution of which it is a subset (Ragin 2008: 165-6).   
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yield solution formulas that are based on “untenable counterfactual claims” (2012: 167). 
Because, they argue, the standard procedure chooses parsimony as the criterion for selecting 
eligible remainders, “impossible remainders” can be selected, leading to “untenable 
assumptions” (176). In addition, some remainders that are not considered might actually have 
provided grounds for good counterfactual claims (177). They also argue that “incoherent 
counterfactuals” can be used in solutions if the implications of statements – already derived – 
about necessary conditions for the outcome are ignored.  
 
There is much of interest for the user of QCA in their discussion of these problems. Here, 
however, we will concentrate on what seems to us to be a major problem embedded in their 
arguments. It concerns the use they make of “empirical necessary conditions” in both their 
critical arguments about the Standard Analysis and in the development of their ESA. They, 
like Ragin in his discussion of counterfactual analysis, use Stokke’s work in their 
development and advocacy of their ESA.  
 
Schneider and Wagemann on Hidden Necessary Conditions 
As we have noted, “necessary conditions” play an important role in Schneider and 
Wagemann’s arguments. We concentrate our discussion on two of their most developed 
claims. These concern the ways in which necessary conditions do or do not appear in fsQCA-
based analyses of sufficiency. We will concentrate in particular on their claims concerning 
“hidden necessary conditions” which, we argue, require a critical treatment.  
 
They describe “the disappearance of true necessary conditions” as a fallacy that can arise 
“due to two, mutually non-exclusive features of the data at hand” (221). These are: 
 
1. Hidden necessary conditions due to incoherent counterfactuals. 
2. Hidden necessary conditions due to inconsistent truth table rows. 
 
They discuss the first with reference to Stokke's (2007) dataset and the second using invented 
data. We raise questions about both, beginning with their discussion of Stokke’s study, and 
then move on to consider problems in their analysis of the consequences of “inconsistent 
truth table rows”. The latter will require us to consider further aspects of QCA. We will show 
that they appear to have mistaken a particular problem for a more fundamental one.   
 
Hidden necessary conditions due to incoherent counterfactuals 
We have Stokke’s (2007) truth table in Table 2. As already noted, of the 32 possible rows, 
only 8 are present with cases, leaving 24 as remainders. Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 
222) note that a parsimonious solution of this truth table is “~I + SR => SUCCESS” (our 
earlier Equation 3)
8
. They then argue: 
 
From this one might be tempted to conclude that no condition is necessary, for none 
of them appears in both sufficient paths. However, as a glance at the truth table 
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They add, in a footnote, that Stokke himself in his 2007 paper and Ragin and Sonnett (2005, 2008) have 
discussed this. It is worth noting what these authors say. Ragin and Sonnett (2005) note, “Notice, for example, 
that all four causal combinations in Table 3 linked to successful shaming include the presence of A, the support 
of the regime's scientific advisory board. This commonality, which could be a necessary condition for 
successful shaming, would not escape the attention of either a case-oriented researcher or a practitioner 
interested in using shaming as a tactic for stimulating compliance.” (our emphasis) Stokke himself seems to take 
the line that the data at hand is compatible with A being a necessary condition (Stokke, 2007, 507).  
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readily reveals, condition ADVICE (A) is present in all instances of successful 
shaming. It therefore empirically qualifies as a necessary condition.  
 
The “empirically” is important here, as we shall see later, but, first, we summarise Schneider 
and Wagemann’s argument concerning this “hidden necessary condition”. They ask why it 
hasn’t appeared in Equation 3. The answer lies, they note, in the treatment of remainders 
when a parsimonious solution is generated by the fsQCA software. In generating a 
parsimonious solution, remainders can be allocated either the outcome or its absence 
according to the effect of such decisions on the parsimony of the solution. They set out the 
sixteen remainders that have been associated with the outcome, SUCCESS, in order to 
generate the solution in Equation 3. Simplified algebraically, they are (Schneider and 
Wagemann: 223): 
 
~A~C  (~S~I~R + ~S~IR + S~I~R + S~IR + SIR) + 
~AC   (~S~I~R +  ~S~IR + S~I~R + S~IR + SIR) + 
A~C   (~S~IR + S~I~R + S~IR) + 
AC     (~S~I~R  + ~S~IR + S~IR)         
They note that ten include the absence of the “necessary” condition, A, adding, “it is because 
of these incoherent assumptions that the necessary condition A is deemed logically redundant 
and is minimised away from the parsimonious solution term" (223). The example they 
provide is that truth table row 2, A~C~S~I~R, after being matched with the remainder 
~A~C~S~I~R, becomes ~C~S~I~R. After further minimisations involving this new term and 
its minimised descendants, we eventually get to the claim ~I => SUCCESS that forms part of 
Equation 3. They then argue: 
 
This means that every single combination containing ~I either empirically implies 
the outcome or is assumed to imply it, regardless of whether it logically 
contradicts the statement that A is necessary for SUCCESS. This example 
suggests that the disappearance of necessary conditions from statements of 
sufficiency is caused by wrong-headed assumptions about logical remainders. In 
fact, if condition A is necessary for SUCCESS …, then this implies that there 
cannot be any simultaneous occurrence of ~A and SUCCESS.  In other words, 
whenever we see a configuration containing ~A, we expect the outcome 
SUCCESS not to occur. Assuming that in the presence of ~A outcome SUCCESS 
occurs – as we do for the most parsimonious solution when including remainders 
containing ~A – contradicts our conclusion drawn from empirical observation, 
namely that SUCCESS occurs only when condition A is present, and that the 
latter should therefore be interpreted as a necessary condition. In section 8.2, we 
have labelled such assumptions incoherent counterfactuals. (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 223) 
 
Their solution to this problem is “straightforward: do not make any such incoherent 
assumptions” (223-4). In their “enhanced most parsimonious solution” no use will be made of 
“remainders containing the absence of the necessary condition” (224). They proceed to apply 
this suggestion to Stokke’s data. This produces the solution “A~I + ASR => SUCCESS” (our 
earlier Equation 4). Here the “necessary” condition A appears in all terms, as they want. As 
part of their ESA, one must undertake analyses of necessity prior to those of sufficiency.
 
The 
11 
 
danger, they say, of hiding the presence of a necessary condition can be avoided if their 
procedure is used
9
.  
 
Now the question arises of the value and safety of their approach. There are prima facie 
grounds for doubt. The main one is that we appear to be getting something out of nothing, or 
at least out of not very much. Much hinges on the claim that A is necessary for SUCCESS, to 
which we now return. Is the claim well-founded? They claim, “… SUCCESS occurs only 
when condition A is present, and that the latter should therefore be interpreted as a necessary 
condition” (223, our italics). However, we only have 8 of the 32 possible rows from the full 
property space. As they note (see the quote above), were A to be a necessary condition for 
SUCCESS, we would be able to derive the parallel claim, by simple logic, that ~A would be 
sufficient for ~SUCCESS. One “empirical” check on the claim for the necessity of A for 
SUCCESS, then, would be to look at rows where A is absent in order to confirm that 
SUCCESS is also absent for these rows. In a fully populated truth table with five conditions 
there would be 16 rows containing the absence of A. It can be seen from Table 2 that we have 
just one. 15 are missing. The Venn diagram in Figure 2, drawn with the help of the 
TOSMANA software (Cronqvist 2007), brings the problem out very clearly.  
 
 
Figure 2: the 32 configurations (sets) generated by examining SUCCESS=f(ACSIR) 
 
Here, ones indicate the presence of a condition and zeros its absence
10
 (Cronqvist 2007). The 
non-shaded cells are the remainders. The left hand side of Figure 2 shows the 16 
configurations relevant to this test of the corollary of the necessity claim. Just one is available 
(~A~C~SI~R). This should make us question the soundness of the claim that A is necessary, 
                                                          
9
 They note that another way of avoiding the disappearance of a necessary condition, already noted by Stokke 
himself, and Ragin and Sonnett, is to just add it back into the Standard Analysis's parsimonious solution.  
10
 The shading and cross-hatching, as the key indicates, represent sets with the outcome (1), without the 
outcome (0), remainders (R) or sets with contradictory outcomes (C). 
12 
 
unless there is very strong theoretical evidence (or evidence from other studies) that A is 
indeed necessary for SUCCESS, and ~A sufficient for ~SUCCESS. However, Schneider and 
Wagemann rely on the evidence from the eight available rows.  
 
This opens up a critical line of argument, one that draws on their favoured criterion of 
“incoherence”. We can use their own approach to undermine the validity of their solution in 
Equation 4. Let’s look again at the truth table (Table 2), focusing on the absence of 
SUCCESS, i.e. ~SUCCESS . We can see that, based on the 8 existing rows, condition I is, 
“empirically”, a necessary condition for ~SUCCESS. Now, given this, ~I should logically be 
sufficient for SUCCESS. As was the case in their argument, we cannot fully test this 
corollary of the necessity claim. Table 2 has only two of the relevant 16 rows with I=0 
(labelled A~C~S~I~R and ACS~I~R in Figure 2)
11
. Nevertheless, following Schneider and 
Wagemann’s own procedure, we will use this claim, derived from the eight rows, exactly as 
they used the claim that A is necessary, i.e. to draw new conclusions “logically” from 
“empirical” premises.  
 
Here is the argument. We have shown, using their line of reasoning from “empirical” 
necessity claims, but focusing on the negated outcome ~SUCCESS, that ~I should be 
sufficient for SUCCESS. However, their recommended ESA did not generate ~I as a term in 
its solution (Equation 4). In their presented solution, ~I must be conjoined with A. Using their 
reasoning from “empirical” necessity, however, but in relation to I and ~SUCCESS rather 
than A and SUCCESS, we should also have had, e.g., ~A~I appearing as sufficient. This is 
because ~I is sufficient and therefore every configuration that is a subset of ~I should also be 
sufficient. ~A~I is one such configuration. But ~A~I being sufficient contradicts their claim 
that A is necessary. The use of their approach, arguing from “empirical necessary 
conditions”, leads to two contradictory claims. Their initial argument claims A is 
“empirically” necessary but our parallel argument, using their approach, leads to the 
conclusion that ~A~I is sufficient, even though it lacks A.  Put another way, the remainder 
~A~C~S~I~R would be ruled out by their original argument (that A is necessary for 
SUCCESS) but made compulsory by our new argument (that ~I is sufficient for SUCCESS, 
derived from I being “empirically” necessary for ~SUCCESS). This seems to be having your 
cake and eating it
12
. There is an alternative way of presenting this problem with their 
approach, which we give now. 
 
Schneider and Wagemann say we should draw conclusions concerning remainders from the 
fact that, in Table 2, A is “empirically” necessary for success. To allocate remainders without 
A the outcome would contradict this “empirical observation”. This decision is based, we 
noted, on only some of the logically possible relevant configurations.  This “fact” concerning 
necessity can be rewritten as ~A is sufficient for ~SUCCESS. 
 
However, observation also shows that, in Table 2, I is “empirically” necessary for the negated 
outcome, ~SUCCESS. This means that we should, on their argument from empirical 
observation, rule out any remainders having the negated outcome that contradict this “fact”. 
Now, this “fact” implies that ~I is sufficient for ~(~SUCCESS), or that ~I is sufficient for 
SUCCESS.  
 
                                                          
11
 We have twice as many as they have for their argument from the necessity of A for S, but this is still, we 
think, not enough. 
12
 These are the 8 remainder rows that clash in relation to the 2 ESAs: acsir, acsiR, acSir, acSiR, aCsir, aCsiR, 
aCSir and aCSiR. 
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However, now we see where this argument from “empirical observation” in the face of 
limited diversity breaks down. We have these two “empirical” statements: 
 
~A is sufficient for ~SUCCESS   (Statement 1) 
~I is sufficient for SUCCESS       (Statement 2) 
 
Now consider the remainder ~ACS~IR, a subset of both ~A and ~I.   
 
 Statement 1 says it must have the negated outcome 
 Statement 2 says it must have the outcome 
 
The repeated use of their form of argument, from “empirical necessary conditions” - part of 
their ESA - produces a contradiction. More generally, drawing statements from incomplete 
truth tables to use subsequently as the basis for logical reasoning seems problematic. It is 
always likely to produce this type of contradiction. It goes beyond the data in a way that is 
unjustified. Since it is exactly when truth tables are incomplete that the procedure is 
“needed”, we must conclude that it offers less than claimed. 
 
We have used Schneider and Wagemann’s discussion of Stokke’s truth table to raise 
concerns about the use of “empirical” necessary conditions as the premises for arguments. In 
the chapter of their book preceding this discussion, they use the same procedure in discussing 
other problems that they say characterise Standard Analysis. We will discuss just one more of 
these here: the “incoherent counterfactuals” that can arise from “contradictory assumptions”. 
Here they use data from Lipset’s (1959) study of the requisites for the survival of democracy, 
referring to Ragin’s (2009) fuzzy set based analysis of the dataset. Ragin considers five 
potential causal conditions: economic development, urbanisation, literacy, industrialisation 
and political stability. Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 204) show that parsimonious 
solutions for the outcome and its negation can include some of the same logical remainders. 
This is clearly worrying, since in one case the remainders will have been assumed to lead to 
the outcome, but in the other to its negation. This arises, they argue, because the selection of 
remainders here is driven here solely by the goal of parsimony. They then claim that the same 
problem can arise even if only easy counterfactuals are employed. However, they derive their 
directional expectations for the easy counterfactuals for ~S (democracy not surviving) by 
“taking into account the finding that L (high literacy rate) and G (political stability) are 
necessary conditions for S”. The same argument is used in Schneider and Wagemann 
(2013)
13
. But, as in the Stokke case, there is limited diversity: only 9 of the possible 32 truth 
table rows have cases. The claims concerning necessity are therefore based on very limited 
evidence. Furthermore, if L is necessary for S, then we should expect to find ~L being 
sufficient for ~S (and, indeed, this is one of their directional expectations for ~S). However, 
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 They argue:  
 
The analysis of necessity reveals that high literacy rate (L) is an almost perfectly consistent superset for the 
outcome survival of democracy (S). Its consistency of 0.99 and coverage of 0.64 allow it to be interpreted as a 
nontrivial necessary condition (Ragin 2009b: 114). Also, the condition “politically stable countries” (G) can be 
interpreted as necessary for S (consistency 0.92; coverage 0.71). Hence, 
 
L ← S; G ← S. 
 
Declaring L and G as necessary conditions for S implies that S cannot be observed without L and G being 
present. This, in turn, implies that any logical remainder that contains ~L or ~G cannot be assumed to be 
sufficient for S (Schneider and Wagemann 2013: 212-213). 
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of the 16 rows that include ~L, just two are available in the truth table, with 14 missing
14
. 
This is exactly the problem we have discussed in respect of their treatment of Stokke’s truth 
table. Our concern in mentioning this example is not with the basic claim – that incoherent 
counterfactuals and contradictory assumptions can occur when a QCA is performed in the 
context of limited diversity – but rather with the recommended use of “empirical” necessary 
conditions in QCAs. This, as we have shown for the case of the Stokke dataset, brings its own 
danger of introducing contradictions. It is important to add that the solution for the negated 
outcome is explicitly rejected by Ragin (2009: 117) on the grounds that “some of the 
simplifying assumptions that it incorporates are theoretically or empirically untenable”.  
 
Faced with limited diversity, it is possible to make valid, if not complete, sufficiency 
statements based on the evidence available. Even if new evidence comes to light, it cannot 
contradict the statements already derived from the truth table, only allow possible further 
Boolean simplification of them. Any such new solutions will be supersets of the earlier ones. 
This is not the case for necessity statements. The secure testing of necessity statements is only 
possible in very special circumstances, i.e. when every possible instance of the absence of the 
hypothetical necessary condition under study happens to have empirical cases. 
How might we address this problem in empirical research where we have limited diversity? 
One way forward might appear to be to carry out a more exhaustive search for “empirical 
necessary conditions” during the process of addressing the limited diversity in a truth table. 
In the case of Stokke, as we have shown, this would involve searching for the “empirical 
necessity” of a range of conditions, “necessary” not just for the outcome but also for its 
negation. In the case of the Stokke data, following Schneider and Wagemann’s procedure, 
one would then rule out using any remainders as simplifying assumptions that contradict 
either their “empirical necessary condition” or the one we added. But, as we saw, using our 
“empirical necessary condition” allows us to argue that ~A~I should be sufficient while theirs 
ruled this out, generating a logical contradiction. Since it is well-known that any statement at 
all can be derived from a logical contradiction, this cannot be a satisfactory way to proceed. 
The basic problem here arises from using logical deduction on two premises that have been 
chosen, inductively, on the basis of limited evidence. For us, this suggests that the procedure 
suggested by Schneider and Wagemann is inherently problematic, given a less than complete 
truth table – exactly the situation it is intended to address.  
 
Is there a less problematic way of addressing the problem? One response is to focus less on 
logic applied to premises concerning “empirical necessary conditions” derived from 
incomplete truth tables and, instead, to focus, as Ragin (2008: 163) recommends
15
, on what 
theory and substantive knowledge of cases can suggest concerning remainders. In the case of 
the Stokke dataset, for example, one would consider carefully whether it made theoretical 
sense to consider A to be a necessary condition. Is it possible to conceive of cases (or do they 
exist elsewhere) where the outcome could occur in the face of ~A? In the case of Stokke’s 
analysis, this might be the case, i.e. one can imagine a successful case of shaming in which 
the shamers cannot refer to recommendations of a regime’s scientific body, but where other 
factors compensate for the lack of this, rendering A non-necessary. Such reasoning should, of 
course, be combined with an examination of its consequences for the analysis. One would 
still want to avoid contradictory simplifying assumptions, i.e. the use of the same remainders 
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 They also include a footnote (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 204) in which they say it is possible to 
generate counterfactuals that contradict the statements of necessity of L and G for S. Again, they reason here 
from “empirical” necessity.  
15
 Schneider and Wagemann themselves often refer to the importance of case knowledge and theory, for 
example in developing their Theory-Guided Enhanced Standard Analysis, but, in discussing Stokke and their 
ESA, the stress is on logic. 
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in solutions for both the outcome and its negation. It may also be possible to rule out some 
configurations as logically impossible combinations, as in Schneider and Wagemann’s 
example of a pregnant man. However, it is important not to claim there is some universal 
solution to the problems caused by limited diversity.  Our own work with QCA has often 
used large n datasets (e.g. Cooper 2005; Cooper and Glaesser 2011a, 2012b; Glaesser and 
Cooper 2011, 2012, 2013). In this context case knowledge may be relatively lacking and 
existing theory will need to be prioritised when faced with limited diversity (which, even 
given large n, does occur). On the other hand, in some small n settings – those where there is 
little existing work – existing theory may be in short supply and case knowledge will come to 
the fore. All of this can be achieved while using Ragin’s Standard Analysis. In addition, if the 
analysist wishes to include a remainder that is omitted by Standard Analysis’s initial focus on 
parsimony, this can easily be added after theoretical reflection on the full range of truth table 
rows, as recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 2013). We turn now to their 
second key claim, that concerning “hidden necessary conditions” due to inconsistent truth 
table rows. 
 
Hidden necessary conditions due to inconsistent truth table rows 
Schneider and Wagemann (21012) begin their second section on “hidden necessary 
conditions” by noting that, unfortunately, incoherent assumptions about remainders are not 
the only reason for the disappearance of necessary conditions. They state that necessary 
conditions can disappear even from a conservative solution term (their preferred term for 
what we have, along with Ragin, termed a complex solution). This can arise, they say, when 
“inconsistent truth table rows are included in the logical minimisation that contain the 
absence of the necessary condition” (225). By “inconsistent” rows, they refer to rows 
containing cases where some achieve the outcome and some do not. They illustrate this 
possibility with the hypothetical example reproduced here as Table 3. They note this table 
“does not suffer from limited diversity” (though others might think, depending on the 
inadequacy of their case knowledge, that rows with just one or two cases do constitute limited 
diversity).  
 
Table 3: Schneider and Wagemann’s (2012) Table 9.2 
 Conditions Outcome  
Row A B C Y Cases with Y Cases with ~Y Consistency for Y 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 1 20 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0 0 39 0 
4 0 1 1 0 0 15 0 
5 1 0 0 1 10 0 1 
6 1 0 1 1 15 0 1 
7 1 1 0 1 4 1 0.8 
8 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 
 
In order to assess the validity of their argument, we need to introduce the measures of 
consistency with sufficiency and necessity that are employed in the fsQCA software. Given 
that their truth table is built on the basis of crisp sets where a case in either fully in or fully 
16 
 
out of the set, these concepts are straightforward
16
. For strict sufficiency of a condition, or a 
conjunction of conditions, X for Y we need, wherever X is present, to find Y also present.  
This requires the subset of cases with the conditions X to be a subset of the cases with the 
outcome Y (shown as the left-hand side of Figure 3). For strict necessity of a condition Z for 
Y, on the other hand, we need, given the outcome Y, always to find the condition Z present. 
This requires the set of cases with the outcome Y to be a subset of the set of cases with the 
condition Z (shown as the left-hand side of Figure 4). In practice, subset relations in the 
social world are frequently not as perfect as these.  
 
The more realistic right-hand sides of the two figures show such approximations to 
sufficiency (Figure 3) and necessity (Figure 4). Ragin uses, for crisp sets, a simple measure of 
the closeness of such relations to strict subsethood. Consider sufficiency. On the right-hand 
side of Figure 3, he takes the proportion of cases in X that fall within the boundaries of Y as a 
measure of the consistency of these data with sufficiency. Such imperfect subset relations are 
usually described with the terms quasi-sufficient (and, for necessity, quasi-necessary). In the 
case of Figure 3, the right-hand side would give us a consistency of the order of 0.8, usually 
taken as large enough in the literature to support a claim of quasi-sufficiency. 
 
Figure 3: strict and quasi-sufficiency of X for Y 
 
 
Figure 4: strict and quasi-necessity of Z for Y 
 
 
After these preliminaries, we can return to Schneider and Wagemann’s argument. Looking at 
row 7 of Table 3, it can be seen that, of these five cases that are AB~C, four have the 
outcome Y. This configuration is therefore quasi-sufficient for Y, with a consistency of 0.8. If 
we run a QCA on the truth table in Table 3 that allows row 7 to go forward (i.e. if we accept a 
consistency of 0.8 as adequate for quasi-sufficiency) we obtain the following minimised 
solution: 
 
Equation 5: A~C  +  ~BC  => Y    
The first term, A~C, has a consistency with sufficiency of 0.93 and the second, ~BC, of 1.0. 
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 This is not the case when fuzzy sets are used (see, e.g., Ragin 2006). 
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As Schneider and Wagemann note, no single condition appears in both paths and one might 
be “tempted to conclude there is no necessary condition for Y” (226). They note, however, 
that separate tests for necessary conditions show ~B to be necessary for Y, with a very high 
consistency of 0.92
17. They argue that, “based on the empirical evidence, we have good 
reasons to consider ~B to be a relevant necessary condition for Y”. They give this reason why 
it has disappeared: 
 
Why, then, is ~B not part of all sufficient paths in the conservative solution? 
Necessary condition ~B is logically minimized from the sufficiency solution by 
matching row 5 of Table 9.2 (A~B~C) with the inconsistent row 7 (AB~C) into 
the sufficient path A~C. ... thus, the necessary condition disappears from the 
sufficiency solution because both the former and the latter are not fully 
consistent. In other words, this is an example of a hidden necessary condition due 
to inconsistent subset relations. (226) 
 
This, we think, is far from the whole story. To see why, consider a small change in the truth 
table, one that removes the problem of inconsistency. Assume, contrary to what we see in 
Table 3, that all five cases in row 7 achieve the outcome Y. What then happens when we 
undertake a QCA that parallels that reported by Schneider and Wagemann? On the basis of 
changing just one case from not having to having the outcome, we obtain the same algebraic 
solution as in Equation 5 (though in this case both terms are strictly sufficient, i.e. have 
consistencies of 1). And, once again, ~B is quasi-necessary for Y (with a consistency of 
0.90). We have no inconsistent rows, but we still see the “problem” Schneider and 
Wagemann are addressing.  
 
This clearly suggests that the problem of a hidden necessary condition concerning Schneider 
and Wagemann is not due to the inconsistency of row 7 per se. What then is its cause? A 
glance at the truth table shows there are quite different numbers of cases in the rows. It is 
instructive to undertake another analysis. If we increase the number of cases in row seven to 
40, but retain the proportion in this row achieving the outcome at 0.8, we obtain the same 
solution for sufficiency (with the first term having a consistency of 0.84 and the second of 1), 
but we now find that a test for the necessity of ~B returns a consistency of only 0.58. ~B is no 
longer a hidden quasi-necessary condition. The “problem” disappears. It seems that the 
inconsistency of row 7 is not in itself the fundamental problem. We can remove the problem 
of the disappearance of ~B by reweighting so that it is no longer a necessary condition in the 
first place. We also showed that ~B, when it is a necessary condition, can disappear from the 
solution even in the absence of this inconsistency.  
 
The fundamental problem is not due to inconsistencies per se (though these will modify the 
way it appears) but to the relative numbers of cases in the rows of a truth table, coupled with 
the manner in which the arithmetic of proportions works. Indeed we can make the problem 
much worse by running the analysis with just one case in row 7 – a case which has the 
outcome ; again therefore with no inconsistency characterising this row. Doing this, we 
obtain the solution for sufficiency in Equation 5 (with both terms having consistencies of 1) 
while the consistency with necessity of ~B rises to an almost perfect 0.98.  
 
Clearly, Schneider and Wagemann have, in choosing their example, brought an important 
issue to our attention. They have not, however, treated it in a general enough fashion. Given 
limitations of space, we will merely indicate one way of thinking about this problem that can 
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 45 of the 49 cases with the outcome Y have the condition ~B. 
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keep things clear in one’s mind when undertaking the analysis of truth tables.  This involves 
regarding each row as evidence for the sufficiency or otherwise of the configuration it 
represents, while ignoring at this stage finer details concerning the degree of consistency with 
sufficiency (or necessity). Assume, for the sake of argument, that the evidence for each 
configuration in Table 3 is considered good enough to treat the rows as warrant for the eight 
claims in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: eight statements concerning sufficiency 
Configurations with the outcome Y Configurations with the outcome ~Y 
  AB~C=>Y 
~A~BC=>Y 
  A~BC=>Y 
  A~B~C=>Y 
  ABC=>~Y 
~A~B~C=>~Y 
~AB~C=>~Y 
~ABC=>~Y 
 
Looking at the truth table in this way, we see that ~B is not strictly a necessary condition for 
Y, since AB~C=>Y. If we were to run a QCA on the temporary assumption that there is just 
one case per row, then we will obtain a consistency with necessity for ~B for Y of 0.75, 
reflecting the fact it appears in three of the four rows to the left of Table 4. It can readily be 
seen, however, that, the higher the number of cases for the three lower rows to the left of 
Table 4 (~A~BC, A~BC, A~B~C) in relation to those for the row AB~C, the higher will be 
the reported consistency of necessity of ~B for Y, and the more serious the problem of this 
quasi-necessary condition being hidden in the solution for sufficiency will appear to be.  If 
we allocate three cases each to the three lower rows on the left-hand side, leaving the row 
AB~C with just one, then consistency with necessity for ~B for Y is 0.90. If on the other 
hand, we allocate 10 cases to AB~C, while leaving the lower three rows with just one case 
each, then the consistency with necessity for ~B for Y falls to 0.23.  
 
Schneider and Wagemann, apparently believing that their problem is due to inconsistent 
rows, propose the “imperfect remedy” of increasing thresholds for consistency. They point 
out that had a stricter threshold for sufficiency of 1.0 been used, then the inconsistent row 
AB~C would not have been allowed into the minimisation process and the “necessary 
condition ~B would not thus have been logically minimised away”. However, as they note, 
were the same threshold used for testing necessity, ~B would no longer be a necessary 
condition!  
 
We have shown that this problem is a more difficult one than they suggest, having its roots 
not so much in inconsistent rows as in the distribution of cases across rows. For this reason, 
even in truth tables with no contradictory (or inconsistent) rows, the problem needs to be at 
the forefront of a QCA-user's mind. Ragin’s (2000: 105, 254) advice should, of course, be 
followed: perform necessary conditions tests prior to sufficiency tests
18
. In addition, we 
would recommend that the sort of thinking we have illustrated in respect of Table 4 can help 
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 One reviewer of this paper has pointed out that since many QCAs consider both the outcome and its negation, 
then, given that every sufficiency claim in respect of O, as we have noted earlier, entails a necessity claim in 
respect of  ~O, and vice versa, this suggestion is redundant. However, this entailment is only secure in the 
context of strict sufficiency and strict necessity and becomes insecure when quasi-sufficiency and quasi-
necessity are allowed (as they are in many QCAs). 
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QCA-users understand better what is going on when they analyse a truth table where the 
distribution of cases across the rows is uneven. Having undertaken such thought experiments, 
researchers should come to understand better the implications of the distribution of cases for 
fsQCA's sufficiency and necessity indices. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, focusing on what Schneider and Wagemann say about hidden necessary 
conditions, we have found ourselves confronting some of the complexities of QCA. Our 
discussion of their analysis of Stokke’s data showed the importance of exploring the logical 
consequences of apparently harmless working assumptions. The underlying problem with 
their approach, as we have argued in our section on “hidden necessary conditions due to 
incoherent counterfactuals”, is perhaps the application of logic to derive conclusions from 
premises (for example concerning “necessary conditions”) whose own status, because of 
limited diversity, is insecure. We have shown that elements of their recommended approach 
can lead to internally contradictory conclusions. Ragin (2008) has argued, in the face of 
limited diversity, for intermediate solutions based on the inclusion of only those logical 
remainders for which a good theoretical or substantive case can be made. Taken in 
conjunction with checks for the unintended inclusion of contradictory simplifying 
assumptions, this should allow the Standard Analysis to avoid some of the problem that can 
arise in applying logic in contexts of limited diversity (see, for example, the literature referred 
to by Yamasaki and Rihoux (2009) and their discussion of ways of avoiding the problem
19
). 
As it happens, in presenting their arguments for the use of “good counterfactuals” in 
constructing intermediate solutions that they argue the Standard Analysis would rule out, 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 2013) do focus on theoretical soundness, as recommended 
by Ragin (2008). Our subsequent discussion of the relation between hidden necessary 
conditions and inconsistent rows in truth tables shows that all the usual problems concerning 
the arithmetic of proportions (weighted averages, etc.) and the weighting of samples 
(Glaesser and Cooper 2012) need to be taken into account in carrying out and interpreting the 
results of a QCA, not just those arising from simple logic. QCA must be seen as a very 
valuable contribution to social science, but certainly not as one for those looking to avoid 
some careful mathematical and logical thinking. This is especially true for fuzzy set QCA, 
but not just for fuzzy set QCA, as our discussion has shown. This raises some more general 
points.  
 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 2013) make considerable use of illustrative examples in 
developing their arguments. In principle, this is a useful strategy, especially for readers who 
lack a mathematical background. It does, however, carry the danger that their readers will not 
appreciate the importance of developing a more general understanding of the methods they 
employ, of what is going on “under the bonnet”. Schneider and Wagemann may believe that 
readers can develop a more general understanding on the basis of illustrations of problems 
and how to address them but our discussion of their two arguments shows that there are 
dangers inherent in this approach.  
 
They certainly seem to believe that the mathematical and logical demands of QCA and 
fsQCA are not high, writing (16-17): 
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 They note the problem is greater when there is much limited diversity. Goertz, Hak and Dul (2013), in 
discussing ways of analysing the boundary between regions of observations and of no observations provide us 
with another way of conceptualising some related issues.  
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The challenge in understanding set-theoretic methods is not so much in grasping the 
math that is behind them. In fact, in terms of standard mathematical operations, not 
much more is required than simple subtraction and division of natural numbers. It is 
not even required to delve too deeply into the more complex intricacies of formal 
logic and set theory. The three rather simple logical operators (AND, OR and NOT) 
and the notions of subsets and supersets suffice for denoting any possible result that 
can be obtained using QCA.  
 
Notwithstanding that they add, “yet understanding and correctly using set-theoretic methods 
is challenging” (17), we believe this claim concerning the demands of QCA to be misleading. 
Some aspects of QCA, especially fsQCA, can be complex and puzzling, reflecting the 
complexity of fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic. It can be necessary to think long and hard 
about what is going on “under the bonnet” (see Cooper and Glaesser 2011b, for an example 
concerning the paradoxical findings that can arise when the laws of conventional logic are 
modified in fuzzy set QCA).  
 
There is a growing demand for guidance on using QCA. Schneider and Wagemann’s (2012) 
book, with its recommendations for “good practice”, is therefore likely to be widely read. The 
book encourages its readers to follow its recommended procedures, by its use of such 
subheadings as the “Recipe for a good QCA”, its claims concerning “Enhanced Standard 
Analysis”, and its continual references to “best practice” (as in “we add further strategies that 
go beyond the current best practice approach” (151)). Our own view is that, at this stage of 
the development of set theoretic approaches, a less authoritative tone would be more 
appropriate. Ragin’s own seminal work seems to us to have been characterised by a 
continuing search to find ever more fruitful ways of applying set-theoretic analysis to social 
science data. He has demonstrated, in his development of QCA, how best to respond to critics 
of his methods: use constructive criticism as a way to improve them. Schneider and 
Wagemann’s ESA is presented as an improved form of QCA, especially relevant to 
addressing “limited diversity”. We hope that this paper, in showing that their approach is not 
without its own problems, will contribute in some small way to the important debate about 
the most appropriate ways of dealing with limited diversity.  
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